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Proposals to Expel Palestinians from the
Occupied Territories as Catalyst for a Civil
Adjudication. Campaign
Catherine A. Rogers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The unspeakable has not only been spoken, but articulated as a formal
political strategy. In November 2002 Israeli Tourism Minister Benny Elon
publicly urged the "transfer" of Palestinians from the West Bank, and his far-
right Moledet party launched a formal publicity campaign in Israel advocating
the position. Apparently echoing these calls, House Majority Leader Dick
Armey later stated to a U.S. audience his "belie[f] that the Palestinians should
leave" the West Bank and that "there are many Arab nations that have many
hundreds of thousands of acres of land, soil and property and opportunity to
create a Palestinian state."2 Just a few short years ago, the notion of "transfer"
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escape the ravages of war.
1. Radical New Plan for Mideast Peace; Israeli Movement Builds for Arab Population
Transfer, at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE-ID=29671 (posted
November 15, 2002). The article states that the Moledet's new peace plan, called the "Elon Peace
Plan," calls for the "forcible removal" of the Palestinians from the West Bank into surrounding Arab
states, mainly Jordan. Id. Elon is quoted as saying, "The state of Israel must demand the relocation of
the refugees as a precondition of peace within an), future negotiations. We cannot relinquish these
lands, and we cannot live peacefully with the Arab population currently living in them.... When
you look at it, transfer is the only conclusion. It is the only light at the end of the tunnel." Id. For a
complete discussion of the "peace plan" see the Moledet Party website at:
http://www.moledet.org.il/english/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
2. Interview by Chris Matthews with Dick Armey, House Majority Leader, United States
House of Representatives, Hardball with Chris Matthews (CNBC television broadcast, May 1, 2002)
(transcript available at http://counterpunch.org/armeyD502.html); see also Matthew Engel, Senior
Republican calls on Israel to Expel West Bank Arabs, GUARDIAN, May 4, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,70991I9,00.html (reporting that, although shocking in
its language, the interview was only mentioned as a "passing reference in the deepest recesses of
yesterday's New York Times and Washington Post") (citing Allison Mitchell, Mideast Turmoil:
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was a term not uttered in public in Israel. 3 Today, it appears at least to some
leading Israeli experts and academics that "transfer" is not only considered aS 4
viable goal for the current Israeli leadership, but also a proximate one.
The term "transfer" is considered a euphemism for "expulsion" or, in
international parlance, "ethnic cleansing." In addition to violating international
law, for those who study the region, proposals for transfer raise serious concerns
about the prospect for Middle East stability and peace. 6 As a consequence, the
threat of forced expulsion of the Palestinians from the Occupied Territories has
revived concerns about how to protect Palestinian rights and how to pressure
Israel to comply with international law. 7 In this Essay, I will explore whether an
international civil adjudication campaign might provide an answer.
Congress; House and Senate Support Israel in Strong Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2002, at
A10); Demand Dick Armey Retract Call for Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinians, at
http://www.progessivaustin.org/armey.htm (May 3, 2002) (providing the complete transcript of the
interview and stating that "Armey's call for the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians is an endorsement
of massive war crimes probably rising to the level of crimes against humanity"); Alexander
Cockburn, Wild Justice: Palestine Moves to Dallas-Fort Worth, 15 N.Y. PRESS, available at
http://www.nypress.com/15/19/news&columns/wildjustic.cfm (May 8, 2002) (stating that Majority
Leader Armey's comments were "the most explicit call for ethnic cleansing by a prominent
American since Sherman's designation of the only good Indian being a dead one"). For
Representative Armey's later efforts to clarify these remarks, see infra note 42 and accompanying
text.
3. See, e.g., Martin van Crevald, Sharon's Plan is to Drive Palestinians across the Jordan,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/04/28/
wpal28.xml (filed April 28, 2002). The Israeli historian demonstrates this by saying:
Two years ago, less than eight per cent of those who took part in a Gallup poll among
Jewish Israelis said they were in favour of what is euphemistically called 'transfer' -
that is, the expulsion of perhaps two million Palestinians across the River of Jordan.
This month [April 20021 that figure reached 44 per cent.
Id. See also Ben Lynfield, The Moledet Partys Media Blitz For the Mass Expulsion of Palestinians
Is Gaining Momentum, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2002 (stating that Elon himself recognizes
that his position of transfer was "taboo" but wants to bring the idea back into the discussions),
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0206/p05s01 -wome.html.
4. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
5. John Quigley, Repairing the Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 34-
35 (2001); UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res.
1995/13, U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., at 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/L.I 1/51 (1995). The United
Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities have
equated the "practices of forcible exile, mass expulsions and deportations, population transfer,
'ethnic cleansing' and other forms of forcible displacement of populations within a country or across
borders." Id.
6. The Jordan Times quoted Jordan's King Abdullah warning that U.S. military action
against Iraq could produce an "Armageddon" in the Middle East. Gareth Smyth, Cheney's MidEast
tour provokes hostile Arab reaction, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 14809759.
According to the long-time U.S. ally, such action could go "completely awry" and destabilize the
entire region. He added, "If our aim is to win against terrorism, we can't afford more instability in the
area. Once you go down the road of violence, it is very, very difficult to control it." Id.
7. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
A Palestinian Civil Litigation Campaign
I begin in Part II with a brief sketch of the history of stated policies to expel
Palestinians from what is now Israel and the Occupied Territories, and then
examine recent proposals that have been made and actions that have been taken
to implement modern re-articulations of those historic policies. In Part III, I then
review the grounds on which international law proscribes mass expulsions of
indigenous and occupied peoples. While international law governing this issue is
clear in its application and has been overwhelmingly endorsed by the largerS8.
international community, international law seems to have little influence on
Israel's conduct. 9 For this reason, my primary focus in this Essay will not be to
analyze the international law issues, which have been exhaustively discussed
elsewhere. 10 I focus instead, in Part IV, on the enforcement of this well-
established international law through private law suits. I review both civil
adjudication's promise as an enforcement mechanism and the many obstacles
that stand in the way of its success. I cannot in the space of this Essay analyze or
resolve all obstacles, but I hope to outline the various benefits and limitations of
adjudication as a response to human rights violations in this context, and to
proffer a checklist of some of the important practical considerations entailed in
launching an international civil litigation campaign on behalf of Palestinians.
II. PROPOSALS AND EFFORTS TO EXPEL PALESTINIANS
The notion of "transfer" of the Palestinian population has some antecedents
that predate the creation of Israel. Others have traced in detail the history ofSII
Israeli expulsion plans, but one quote by Joseph Weitz, director of the Jewish
National Fund's Land Department, captures the reasoning behind the idea of
transfer:
'[I]t must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples
... If the Arabs leave it, the country will become wide and spacious
for us ... The only solution [after the end of World War II] is a Land
of Israel, at least a western Land of Israel [i.e., Palestine], without the
Arabs. There is no room here for compromises ... There is no way
but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to
transfer all of them, save perhaps for [the Arabs of] Bethlehem,
Nazareth, and old Jerusalem. Not one village must be left, not one
8. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
9. For a cataloging of UN Security Council Resolutions condemning Israeli conduct in the
Occupied Territories, see infra note 59; see also infra note 64 (providing inventory of widespread
condemnation of Israeli conduct).
10. See infra note 47.
11. See generally NUR MASALHA, ExPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE CONCEPT OF
"TRANSFER" IN ZIONIST POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1882-1948 (1992); NUR MASALHA, IMPERIAL ISRAEL
AND THE PALESTINIANS, THE POLITICS OF ExPULSION (2000); see also BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH
OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 (1987); JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND
ISRAEL (1990); HENRY CATTAN, THE PALESTINE QUESTION (1988).
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[Bedouin] tribe. The transfer must be directed at Iraq, Syria, and even
Transjordan. For this goal funds will be found... And only after this
transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers and
the Jewish problem will cease to exist. There is no other solution.'
12
On other occasions, the calls to forcibly expel Palestinians have been more
explicit, such as Prime Minister Ben Gurion's orders to Israeli generals in 1948:
"Drive them out!" 
13
Fast forward to today, this reasoning still appeals to some. Gamla, a group
founded by former Israeli military officers and settlers, recently published a nine
thousand word manifesto on its website entitled "The Logistics of Transfer."
14
The site refers to expulsion of every Palestinian as "the only possible
solution." 15 While the author acknowledges that Israel will never win
widespread international support for expulsion, he argues that "only a modicum
of sureort from its closest ally-the United States" is necessary to carry out the
plan. The plan detailed on the website includes an information campaign,
systematic policies to make life unbearable for Palestinians and, finally, military
strikes followed by immediate destruction of the homes evacuated in the
strike. 17
In another example, the "Hamotzi-Assisted Emigration Services" is a group
whose apparent aim is to rid the Occupied Territories of Palestinians because, it
12. MORRIS, supra note 1I, at 27 (quoting from Weitz's diary). This vision found formal
political expression in the Transfer Committees that operated in the nascent State of Israel. In 1948,
Mr. Weitz pressed vigorously for creation of the First Transfer Committee. He also presented a
detailed "eviction proposal" to the Committee for Abandoned Arab Property, which (in his words)
contained "a list of Arab villages which should be cleared [of Arabs] in order to round out Jewish
areas." See id. at 100.
13. This account, in which Ben Gurion ordered expulsion of Palestinian populations from
Lydda and Ramleh, was part of the memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin, who was one of the generals
receiving the order. David K. Shipler, Israel Bars Rabin From Relating '48 Eviction of Arabs, N.Y.
TIMES, 23 Oct. 1979, at A3. The IDF executed the order, forcing 60,000 Palestinians out of their
homes. BENNY MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 2 (1994). Originally, this
account was censored from Rabin's memoirs, but it was finally published thirty years later in the
New York Times. Shipler, supra. Similar censorship continues today in efforts to erase the history of
Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. For example, Teddy Katz, a devout Zionist and former
student at Haifa University, wrote a masters thesis that historically documented in more than sixty
hours of interviews with both Jewish and Palestinian eyewitnesses the "cleansing" (a term used at
the time) in 1948 of the Palestinian village of Tantura. John Pilger, Israel's Secret Shame, at
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionlD=22&ItemID=2040 (June 26, 2002).
Despite the fact that a Haifa University professor found it to be "a solid and convincing piece of
work," and even though he was awarded a top grade by the Middle Eastern department, Haifa
University annulled Katz's masters degree because of the thesis. Id.
14. BORIS SHUSTEFF, GAMLA, THE LOGISTICS OF TRANSFER, at
http://www.gamla.org.il/english/article/2002/july/b I.htm (July 3, 2002).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. id.
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claims, "[t]here is no room for compromise. 18 "[A]ny political solution is a
mirage," they argue, because "this is a religious, not political conflict." 19 They
have a significantly different approach than Gamla in effecting their aim,
focusing on what they call "voluntary" emigration.20 While advertising their
services as a form of humanitarian assistance, their website refers consistently to
the desperation that motivates Palestinians to want to leave and its connection to
the current hardships imposed by the occupation and the continuing cycle of
violence. 2 1 The implication is that their larger political goal, even pursued
through "gentle" means, is dependent for its success on life being unbearable for
Palestinians.
22
Viewed in this light, both of these organizations appear to give expression
to what human rights groups have feared-that many Israeli policies are not
simply austere and abusive, but instead establish (either intentionally or
unintentionally) the preconditions for expulsion. The specific policies often
pointed to include the diversion of water from Arab villages, widespread
18. ASSISTED EMMIGRATION SERVICES, at http://www.emigrations.net (last visited April 1,
2003).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. For example the site states:
The only way to escape the incessant cross fire is migration. The last year of this
intifada, although costing Israel dearly in lives and lost income, has so reduced the
average standard of living of Palestinians that about 380,000 Palestinians left their
families and homes to emigrate elsewhere. These emigrants found that there was no
emotional support network to help them adjust to the new country.
Id.
22. In fact, a similar approach was first proposed by Theodor Herzl in 1895 when he stated
"We shall try to spirit the penniless Arab population across the border by procuring employment for
it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our own country." THEODOR HERZL,
DIARIES (1895) (quoted in BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-
ARAB CONFLICT, 1881-1999 at 21 (1999)).
23. For example, a report by the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ) explains that
in the West Bank as a result of discriminatory Israeli water policies, "[r]igorous water quotas are
imposed on Palestinians, supply is often restricted leaving communities without water for
considerable periods, and excess pumping is punished by heavy fines." Jad Isaac, Core Issues of the
Palestinian-Israeli Water Dispute, at http://www.arij.org/pub/corissues/ (Apr. 14, 2003). In addition,
Palestinians are charged "extortionate" rates for their water supply. See id. ("Whereas settlers pay
$0.40 for domestic consumption and a highly subsidized rate of $0.16 for agricultural use,
Palestinians pay a standard rate of $1.20 for their piped water."). With regard to consumption,
"Palestinians are only permitted to use 250 MCM per annum (83 cubic meters/Palestinian/year as a
maximum) while six million Israelis are consuming 2,000 MCM/a (333 cubic meter/Israeli/year).
This means that by force, four Palestinians must survive on the same amount of water consumed by
each Israeli!" PALESTINIAN HYDROLOGY GROUP, ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST PALESTINIAN
WATER SECTOR DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA: ONE METHOD OF ISRAELI ZIONISM, at
http://www.phg.org/ report_02.html (updated Dec. 21, 2000). According to the Palestinian Centre
for Human Rights:
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destruction of infrastructure during recent incursions, 24  and recurring
In the Gaza Strip, Israel also forbids Palestinians from digging any new agricultural
wells, while settlers continue to dig wells at will. As a result, annual per capita
consumption of water among settlers in the Gaza Strip is 1,000 cubic metres, compared
to 172 per Palestinian. Israeli government subsidies make water available to settlers at
one-fourth the price of water for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, despite the enormous
income disparities.
Fact Sheet: Settlements and Apartheid in the OPT, at http://www.pchrgaza.org/facts/fact3.htm (last
updated Mar. 18, 2002).
24. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA), in its Emergency Appeal for 2003:
Palestinians are subject to a variety of closures, curfews, roadblocks and restrictions
that have caused a near-collapse of the Palestinian economy. The restrictions affect
almost all activities, rendering most Palestinians unable to carry out any semblance of
a normal life and subject to daily hardships, deprivations and affronts to human
dignity.
UNRWA, UNRWA EMERGENCY APPEAL 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/pdf/5th-appeal.pdf (Jan.-June 2003) [hereinafter UNRWA
APPEAL]. In addition to these background factors, the actions taken by the Israeli Government during
its "Operation Defensive Shield" in April 2002 left the Palestinian population in the West Bank in
need of 9000 emergency shelters at a cost of $2.7 million. Id. at 12. In a UNRWA press release from
April 16, 2002 the UNRWA describes the Jenin camp as the scene of a town rattled by an
earthquake rather than the ravages of conflict. The UNRWA reported that the Israeli military would
only allow two truckloads of aid to certain areas of the camps. Relief workers heard from residents
that one could hear the voices of the dying from under the piles of rubble of what had been homes,
businesses and schools. Press Release, UNRWA, PAL/1916, UN Relief Mission to Jenin Refugee
Camp Reveals Monumental Destruction, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2002/PALI916.doc.htm (Apr. 16, 2002) [hereinafter UNRWA Press]. The press release indicated
"UNRWA installations such as a school and a health clinic were badly damaged in the assault on the
camp and were extensively damaged by bullets." Id. While difficult to quantify in precise dollar
amounts, it is clear the destruction from Israeli incursions has been devastating on fundamental
civilian infrastructure. SECRETARY GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS, ILLEGAL ISRAELI ACTIONS IN
OCCUPIED EAST JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, REPORT
PREPARED PURSUANT TO G.A. RES. ES-10/10, available at http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/ (July 30,
2002) [hereinafter SECRETARY GENERAL].
Operation Defensive Shield resulted in the widespread destruction of Palestinian
private and public property. Nablus was especially hard hit, especially in its old city,
which contained many buildings of cultural, religious and historic significance....
United Nations agencies and other international agencies, when allowed into Ramallah
and other Palestinian cities, documented extensive physical damage to Palestinian
Authority civilian property. That damage included the destruction of office equipment,
such as computers and photocopying machines, that did not appear to be related to
military objectives. While denying that such destruction was systematic, the Israeli
Defence Forces have admitted that their personnel engaged in some acts of vandalism,
and are carrying out some related prosecutions.
... Over 2,800 refugee housing units were damaged and 878 homes were demolished
or destroyed during the reporting period, leaving more than 17,000 people homeless or
in need of shelter rehabilitation.
Id. The report also includes detailed information of events that occurred in Ramallah in April, where
the IDF ransacked human rights group agencies, other information gathering centers and even
removed computer hard drives and systems so that all statistics and information in these databases
have been completely lost. Id. The report includes eyewitness testimony and the European Union
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deportations of individual civilians or families. 25 Relatedly, the widespread
practices of sealing or demolishing Palestinian homes has been pointed to as a
to utimte epulion 26
refugee-creating policy that may be a predicate to ultimate expulsion.
According to Jewish human rights group B'Tselem,2 7 since 1987 Israel has
"administratively" demolished at least 2450 Palestinian homes, resulting in an
estimated 16,000 Palestinians losing their homes.2 8 It has also been argued that
Israel is intentionally and systematically imposing extreme financial hardship on
the West Bank in an effort to create widespread unemployment, poverty and
malnutrition in the Palestinian population, which would make expulsion
.29
easier.
Report on the same incidents. Id.
25. According to B'Tselem, no actual deportations have occurred since 1992. B'TSELEM, THE
QUIET DEPORTATION: REVOCATION OF RESIDENCY OF EAST JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS, at
http://www.btselem.org/Download/ I 998/TheQuietDeportationContinues.doc (Sept. 1998).
However, in what has been called "quiet deportation," Israel's Ministry of the Interior revoked the
residency of Palestinians living in Occupied East Jerusalem. Id. Between 1997 and 1999 (the latest
statistic it has) approximately 2266 Palestinians have had their residency cards revoked. Id. at
http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/TheQuiet-Deportation.asp.
26. Richard Falk & Bums Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights
in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 133-37
(1991). Home demolition results not only in Palestinians becoming homeless, but often dying. See
infra note 104.
27. B'Tseleni, meaning "in the image of' (from Genesis 1:27), is a privately funded,
Jerusalem-based organization founded in February 1989 by a group of well-known Israeli lawyers,
intellectuals, journalists, and Knesset members to investigate and report independently on human
rights violations in the occupied territories. B'TSELEM, at http://www.btselem.org (last visited Apr. 1,
2003).
28. B'TSELEM, HOUSE DEMOLITION STATISTICS, (1987-2002), at http://www.btselem.org/
English/Planning_&_Building/Statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002). The UN Secretary General
reported that 878 houses were completely destroyed in Jenin alone in 2002. See SECRETARY
GENERAL, supra note 24. Although it is difficult to accurately quantify the number of houses
destroyed, there is no doubt that the practice is taking place, and has since the early days of Israel. In
the (paraphrased) words of a French representative to the UN General back in 1948:
'[m]any of the villages which they had been obliged to leave had been partly
demolished by systematic action which was still continuing.... It was unthinkable that
the horrors perpetrated during the war against the Jewish populations in Europe should
be repeated or should be reproduced in respect of the Arab population. Such a
situation, which was a disgrace to mankind, must be brought to a close.'
John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 171, 183 (1998)
(quoting U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 184th plen. mtg., at 945-46, U.N. Doc. A/PV.184 (1948) (Mr.
Schuman, France)).
29. According to a recent report by the Secretary General, recent events in the area have
contributed to a decline of 30% in the per capita income of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories
resulting in poverty rate of 45%, more than double what it had been before the violence began.
SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 24. The UNRWA Emergency Appeal claims that the poverty rate
is over 55% in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza. UNRWA APPEAL, supra note 24. It also claims that
"[i]n August 2002, the preliminary results of a nutritional survey in the Occupied Territories
conducted jointly by Johns Hopkins University, CARE International, ANERA and others with
funding from USAID were published." Id. The results showed that malnutrition among children
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
Accusations have also been made against certain settlers' activities. An
editorial in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, which was echoed by the Belgian
human rights group Kol Shalom, accuses that by "burning the olive harvests,
damaging the olive trees and preventing farmers from reaching privately owned
groves," the settlers are, with the complicity of the Israeli military, "stealing...
Palestinian food" and thus "laying the groundwork for Transfer, not by the state
but by a group of settlers."
30
Another factor pointed to by human rights activists as an indication of
Israeli policy is the escalating number of governmentally subsidized settlements
in the Occupied Territories-which has increased from an estimated 3176
Jewish settlers at the end of 1976, to approximately 65,000 in 1987, to between
200,000 and 400,000 in 2002.31 The building of so many settlements and the
confiscatory policies that facilitate them 32 have fueled fears of mass expulsions
to close the circle of Israeli annexation of the West Bank. 33 Within the State of
under five had reached emergency levels, with approximately twenty-two percent of children
suffering from acute or chronic malnutrition. Id. Figures in the Gaza Strip were significantly higher.
Id. In both fields, nearly one-fifth of Palestinian children aged from six months to six years were
shown to be moderately or severely anemic. Id. "More than half of the Palestinian population had
been forced to decrease its food consumption." Id. Both the UNRWA Appeal and the SECRETARY
GENERAL'S REPORT blame Israel for the continued activities and for not permitting relief workers
from entering in order to relieve some of the conditions. UNRWA APPEAL, supra note 24;
SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 24. Theses general claims are reinforced by specific reports, such
as that contained in the press release of April 16, 2002 when the UN reported "[a]t one point today a
tank parked itself in front of one of UNRWA's half-full food trucks to prevent it from distributing its
remaining food aid." UNRWA PRESS, supra note 24.
30. Ze'ev Schiff, The army must stop the olive thieves, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 30, 2002, available at
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=224957. Ila'aretz pointed out that
the settlers had enlisted the former Chief Rabbi Mordeachi Eliahu who issued a religious edict ruling
that Palestinian olive harvest belonged to the Jews. Id. In criticizing this edict, Ha'aretz editors
argued that this position "is [a] rape of Jewish religion, the handiwork of idol worshipers and a
disgrace for the people of Israel, whether from the right or the left, secular or religious." Id.
31. Accurate estimates on the number of settlements are difficult to find. The Israeli
organization Shalom Akhshav-"Peace Now"-estimates that there are currently 200,000 settlers,
but its report makes clear that the number is climbing quickly and constantly. PEACE Now, FACTS
ON THE GROUND SINCE THE OSLO AGREEMENTS, at http://www.peace-now.org/
FactsOnTheGroundSinceTheOsloAgreements.PDF (Dec. 4, 2000). Meanwhile, the Foundation for
Middle East Peace, a U.S. organization with a board of academics and former diplomats, estimates
that the number is closer to 400,000. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, SETTLEMENTS, available at
http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/rl298 (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) (citing report by Washington-
based Foundation for Middle East Peace).
32. For a thorough and persuasive discussion of the settlement issue see John Quigley,
Living in Legal Limbo: Israel's Settlers in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1
(1998).
33. Among others, this conclusion was reached in a report by B'Tselem. Eitan Feliner, On
the Way to Annexation: Human Rights Violations Resulting from the Establishment and Expansion
of the Ma'ale Adumim Settlement, reproduced at http://mondediplo.com/1999/1 1/08israel (last
visited March 5, 2003) (based on YUVAL GINBAR, B'TSELEM, ON THE WAY TO ANNEXATION:
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE
MA'ALEH ADUMIM SETTLEMENT (1999)).
[7:2003]
A Palestinian Civil Litigation Campaign
Israel, human rights advocates point to widespread confiscation of Jerusalem
residency cards from Palestinians, lack of funding for basic municipal needs in
Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and discriminatory policies and
practices for issuing building permits in Jernsalem.
34
Against the backdrop of these policies and practices, and notwithstanding
concerned voices from human rights groups and Palestinian advocates, the once
unspeakable idea of physically expelling the Palestinians appears to enjoy more
than marginal political support. Going back to the specific proposals raised at
the beginning of this Essay, Armey's office received more phone calls from
supporters of the notion of transfer than from those in opposition.35 Although
similar statements by major politicians usually garner some reaction in
American editorial and news pages, his comments were largely ignored in the
mainstream press. 36 Meanwhile, in Israel, a significant segment of the general
Israeli population (44% or 46% depending on the survey report) seems to
support expelling the Palestinians, a position formally reserved to a relatively
small group of far-right extremists.
37
34. For example, according to the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of
International Affairs, "Israel applies a number of discriminatory methods to control the number of
Palestinians who legally reside in the city." PASSIA, Fact Sheet-Jerusalem, at
http://www.passia.org/palestine'facts/pdf/pdf2002/jerusalem/IDcards-j.pdf (Apr. 17, 2003). Under
this "Israeli policy of 'quiet deportation' in East Jerusalem-through court judgments, legal and
administrative tactics-has resulted in the revocation of 6,444 ID Cards from Palestinian residents
of East Jerusalem since 1967 (as of April 2001 [and not including dependent children])." Id.
(emphasis in original); see also Shamai Leibowitz, 'The Case of Fareg Ibrahim: symptomatic of a
slow process of ethnic cleansing, at http://electroniclntifada.net/v2/articlel200.shtml (Apr. 14, 2003)
(documenting the illegal detention of and efforts to deport Fareg Ibrahim, an Arab-Egyptian married
to an Arab-Israeli woman, efforts that are allegedly aimed at "caus[ing] Mr. Ibrahim's whole family
to leave their home and property in Israel"); B'TSELEM, supra note 25. B'Tselem claims that "an
Arab may get a building permit to build a two-story building of 50 square meters" while a "Jew
owning the same size plot of land could build an eight-story building of 200 square meters." Id. This
disparate treatment, in the words of one scholar, has meant that "[a]fter its emergence in 1948 Israel
reversed 1800 years of history, usurped Jerusalem and transformed it from an Arab into a Jewish
city, in violation of international law, UN resolutions and the rights of its original inhabitants."
HENRY CATTAN, THE PALESTINE QUESTION 251 (1988).
35. Engel, supra note 2.
36. See id. Many claim that U.S. media intentionally avoids criticism of Israel to avoid
accusations of anti-Semitism. See, e.g., Seth Ackerman, Those Aren't Stone, They're Rocks; The Pro-
Israel Critique of Mideast Coverage, EXTRA!, Mar./Apr. 2001, available at
http://www.fair.org/extra/0103/not-stones.html (detailing complaints CNN received that it was anti-
Semitic because of comments by one reporter that were apparently taken out of context); Jessica
Hodgson, BBC Accused of Anti-Semitism, GUARDIAN (London), May 23, 2002, available at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/israel/story/0,1 1876,720876,00.html; Robert Fisk, How to Shut Up Your
Critics with a Single Word, INDEP. (London), Oct. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story--3445 10.
37. Compare Alexander Cockburn, Sharon's Final Solution for the Palestinians? (May 7,
2002), at http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/COC205A.html (citing a gallup poll conducted in
April 2002 as finding 44% of Israelis supported transfer); with Anthony Amove, Israel and the
Threat of Transfer, (Apr. 9, 2002), at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?SectionlD=22&ltemlD=1666 (citing a March 2002 poll by the Jaffe Center for
Strategic Studies, which "showed that 46 percent of Israelis would support forcibly expelling
Palestinians from their homeland"). The site for the Moledet Party claims that, according to the
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These political realities provide a haunting backdrop to an April 2002
article by one of Israel's best-known military historians, Professor Martin van
Crevald. In the article, Professor van Creveld cautions that Sharon's near-term
goal is to "expel" Palestinians from the West Bank and predicts that a U.S.
attack on Iraq or a terrorist strike in Israel could trigger a massive mobilization
to "clear" the Occupied Territories of their two million Arabs. 38 Since Professor
van Crevald's article, 39 there have been group letters sponsored by hundreds of
Israeli and American academics warning of the same.
Notwithstanding the ominous threat of expulsion, there are signs that calls
for expulsion of Palestinians have not completely overtaken rational discourse.
4 1
Mr. Armey was eventually forced to respond to claims that his comments
amounted to a call for ethnic cleansing and he issued a written statement in the
days following his original remarks claiming that he had been misinterpreted.
42
Ha'aretz Daily newspaper, "46% of Israelis support transfer, according to a study done by Tel Aviv
University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies." MOLEDET, PUBLIC SUPPORT IN ISRAEL, at
http://www.moledet.org.il/english/public.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). The claim is based on
Barzilai Amnon, More Israeli Jews Favor Transfer of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs - Poll Finds,
HA'ARETZ DAILY, March 12, 2002; see also Lynfield, supra note 3 (cautioning of support for
expulsion of Palestinians).
38. van Crevald, supra note 3. While the motives Professor van Crevald ascribes to Israeli
leaders may seem extreme, particularly in light of Sharon's silence on the issue, they are consistent
with other statements made by other Israeli leaders. For example, according to the rightwing
newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT, in November 1989 Benjamin Netanyahu told students at Bar-Ilan
University, "Israel should have exploited the repression of the demonstrations in China, when world
attention focused on that country, to carry out mass expulsions among the Arabs of the territories."
Reprinted in numerous sources, including Will Youmans, Israel May "Tran.fer" Palestinians
During the War on Iraq, at http://endtheoccupation.org/resources/news-articles/youmans.html (Oct.
9, 2002).
39. van Crevald, supra note 3.
40. See PROFESSORS OF CONSCIENCE, LETTER AGAINST EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS,
at http://www.professorsofconscience.org. (last visited Sept. 29, 2002). The website contains letters
from American and Israeli academics that are fearful of the increasing possibility of ethnic cleansing
in the Occupied Territories by the Israeli government. Id. So far 981 American professors have
signed on to the American response letter and, as of September 29, 2002, 187 Israeli professors had
signed the original letter. Id.
41. See Tom Segev, A Black Flag Hangs Over the Idea of Transfer, HA'ARTZ, Apr. 5, 2002,
available at http://www.fpc-wilmette.org/sanders/032902/84segev.html (warning of the
consequences of allowing the topic of transfer to be treated as a subject for legitimate political
discourse).
42. Dick Armey, On the Palestinian Situation, at http://freedom.house.gov/library/
foreignaffairs/hardball.asp (issued May 2, 2002). The posting on the House Majority Leader's
website stated:
In my exchange with Chris Matthews tonight, I left the impression that I believe
peaceful Palestinian civilians should be forcibly expelled from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. This does not reflect my views. I was merely trying to convey my strong
belief that Israel should yield no further territory until its security is assured and that
the individuals who support terrorist acts may properly be exiled from the area. Let me
be clear. Israel is fighting the same war on terrorism that we are fighting. I reaffirm my
support for their right to defend themselves and secure their peace and security.
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The expulsion campaign launched by Israeli Tourism Minister Elon and the
Moledet Party was harshly criticized by the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, which
,, • • ,43
referred to "the disgrace of the transfer idea." Moreover, the newspaper was
joined by opposition leader Yossi Sarid in calling for Sharon to expel Elon from
the coalition for even making the proposal.4 4 Even the Gamla website
acknowledges that the notion of transfer is still considered a "taboo topic" in
Israel, 4 5 which is consistent with the fact that an admittedly fragile majority of
Israelis today support the creation of an independent State of Palestine. V
On balance, however, it appears both from its statements and tactics that
the current Israeli Government views "transfer" as a viable option and an
important strategy. For those who have watched the escalating cycle of violence
between Palestinians and Israelis, the prospect of full-scale efforts to militarily
expel Palestinians threatens disaster for the region and untold further suffering
for Palestinian refugees.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE MASS EXPULSION OF PALESTINIANS
It is clear beyond debate that international law prohibits mass expulsions of
... . . 47
the sort predicted and feared in the Occupied Territories. Although there are
Id.
43. See Lynfield, supra note 3 (quoting HA'ARETZ article).
44. Id.
45. Boris Shusteff, GAMLA, The Logistics of Transfer, at http://www.gamla.org.il/english/
article/2002/july/bl .htm (July 3, 2002) (stating that "The issue of transfer is a taboo topic in Israel. It
is assumed a priori that transfer is impossible, unachievable and immoral to boot. Even to touch
upon the subject is politically incorrect."). This assessment may have changed, particularly when
considering a recent report that states that 63% of Israelis polled think that "the government of Israel
should encourage the emigration of Israeli Arabs." Press Release, Arab Association for Human
Rights, Sixty-three percent of Jewish Israelis think Atrab Citizens are a Threat and Should Be
"Encouraged to Emigrate," available at http://www.arabhra.org/pressrel/pressrel021218.htm (Dec.
19, 2002).
46. Richard H. Curtis, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Support for Palestinians
Growing, available at http://www.aljazeerah.in fo/News%20archi yes/
July/o202002%2ONews%201tems/Support%20for/ 2OPalestinians%20growing.htm (2002) (stating
that in a Nov. 23, 2001 Gallup Poll, "the majority of Israelis support the creation of a Palestinian
state. The poll findings in Israel's Ma'ariv newspaper showed that 59 percent of Israelis support the
creation of a Palestinian state, with just 36 percent opposed. Some 73 percent of the 544 Israeli
adults questioned said they believed that a Palestinian state would emerge, regardless of their
views."): see also SARIT YALOV, A PALESTINIAN STATE AND ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION, POLICY
PAPER NO. 82, ISRAEL AND A PALESTIAN STATE: ZERO SUM GAME? (2001) (claiming that Israeli
citizens had a dismal approval rate of 29% in 1992 for an independent state, which climbed to 50%
in 1997), available at http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/ppO82-xs.htm; CNN, Polls:
Sharon is Front-runner to Lead Likud, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/
meast/ 11/27/israel.politics/ (Nov. 27, 2002) (claiming that as of late 2002 a majority of Israelis still
favored an independent Palestinian state).
47. For a compelling discussion of how "expulsion" violates the various facets of
international law see John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L
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several sources of legal authority, the most obvious is Article 49 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive.
48
In this provision, the term "protected persons" refers to "those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves.., in the hands of
a[n] ... Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."
49
These prohibitions have been interpreted to apply not only to prohibit
militarily imposed expulsion, but also to extend to orders, actions, policies and
practices, intentionally aimed at directly or indirectly generating refugees.
5 0
These less overt means of expulsion involve more subtle questions of fact about
whether a particular transfer is voluntary or involuntary, and whether it is the
consequence of an affirmative governmental policy or an unintended
consequence of otherwise legitimate governmental policies. It is beyond the
scope of this Essay to engage in a protracted discussion of whether the various
practices described above (settlements, home demolition, water diversion, etc.)
violate international law prohibiting expulsion because most of these practices
also constitute separate violations of other international human rights law. For
example, the United Nations' Committee Against Torture concluded in
L.J. 171, 219-27 (1998); see also Christopher M. Goebel, A Unified Concept of Populations
Transfer, 22 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4-6 (1993) (defining "expulsion" as "[t]he mass removal
of citizens across internationally recognized borders of a state"). Goebel goes on to state that such
deportations or transfers were considered "crimes against humanity" by the Nuremberg War Crimes
Tribunal and also argues that these actions violate human rights law in times of peace. Id. See also
George E. Little, Forced Movement of Peoples, 90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 545 (1996) (claiming
that forced transfer of individuals is prohibited by Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in
times of armed conflict and by Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
for aliens during times of peace). Cf Kathleen Sarah Galbraith, Moving People: Forced Migration
and International Law, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 597 (1999) (analyzing expulsion in the former
Yugoslavia).
48. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S 287,318. Notably, both the General
Assembly and Security Council have declared Israel's expulsion of inhabitants from Occupied
Territories to violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. Quigley, supra note 47, at 221-22.
49. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 48, art. 4.
50. The preamble to the International Law Association's Declaration of Principles of
International Law on Mass Expulsion, adopted at the 62d Conference, Seoul, Korea, August 24-30,
1986, states that "mass expulsion results from the use of coercion, including a variety of political,
economic and social measures which are directly, or even more so indirectly, force people to leave
or flee their homelands for fear of life, liberty or security .. " reprinted in JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE app. 6 at 224
(1995). As Jean-Marie Henckaerts states: "expulsion of nationals, whether through direct expulsion
orders or through indirect refugee-generating policies, are clearly prohibited in international law."
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Introductory remarks to George E. Little, Forced Movement of Peoples, 90
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 545, 545 (1996).
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November 2001 that Israeli demolitions of Palestinian homes and policies on
closure may in certain instances amount to cruel, inhuman or degradinA
treatment or punishment, in breach of the UN Convention Against Torture.
House demolition has also been decried by a range of human rights groups as
violating international human rights and humanitarian law against collectiveS 52 ...
punishment. This overlap is not surprising since modem international law
prohibitions against expulsions reflect a consolidation, because historically mass
expulsions have been accompanied by, and accomplished through, other serious
violations of international law.5 3 When the more general prohibition against
mass expulsion was not as clearly pronounced as today, these ancillary
violations were pointed to as a basis to denounce the larger expulsion.
5 4
Although Israel is a signatory to the Geneva Convention, over the years
some Israeli scholars and politicians have advanced arguments that the Fourth
Geneva Convention does not apply to the Occupied Territories.55 The various
51. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: ISRAEL, available at
http://193.194.138.190/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CAT.C.XXVII.Concl.5.En?Opendocument (Nov. 23,
2001). For a thorough analysis of the various international human rights violated by Israeli policies
and practices of house demolition, see John Quigley, Punitive Demolition of Houses: A Study in
International Rights Protection, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Usama R. Halabi, Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Israeli Occupied
Territories: A Critical Legal Analysis, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251, 267 (1992); see also
B'TSELEM, POLICY OF DESTRUCTION: HOUSE DEMOLITION AND DESTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND IN THE GAZA STRIP, at http://www.btselem.org/Download/Policy_oLDestruction-Eng.pdf
(Feb. 2002). For a thoughtful and detailed analysis of the application of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to various Israeli practices and policies regarding the Palestinians, see Ardi Imseis, On
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65,
100-21 (2003) (examining Israeli annexation and expropriation of Palestinian land, construction of
Jewish settlements, infliction of torture and other great suffering or serious bodily injury, deportation
of Palestinians, and deprivation of various rights, including right to a fair and regular trial). In
addition, the UN Secretary General's report of July 30, 2002 provides other potential bases for
human rights claims in its documenting of how Israel "has confiscated Palestinian land, exploited
and abused natural resources and created a separate structure of life, including a different system of
law, to carry out its illegal settlement campaign, which is the only remaining colonial phenomenon
in the world at the beginning of the 21st century." SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 24, at 21.
Other examples of separately cognizable human rights violations abound. See, e.g., Isaac, supra note
23 (noting that Israeli discriminatory and confiscatory water policies violate the Geneva
Convention).
53. Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 689,
735-37 (1994) (describing the range of human rights that are violated when displacement or
expulsion occurs).
54. See id. at 738-39 (noting that international law on displacement is less well developed
and thus stressing the importance of component human rights violations).
55. For example, Israel has taken the position that the West Bank and Gaza are
"administered areas" rather than "occupied territories," though Israel has always claimed to apply
certain humanitarian provisions regarding the protection of civilians. Meir Shamgar, The
Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, I ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 262,
266 (1971). Israel's argument, as articulated by Professor Justus Weiner, is that the Fourth Geneva
Convention focuses on protecting civilians during war and has virtually nothing to say about
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theories proffered point to a range of factors that arguably make the Israeli
occupation somewhat unique, such as the fact that Israel did not oust an
established sovereign (Jordan had been occupying the West Bank) or the
extreme length of the Israeli occupation. 57 These various attempts to argue that
its occupation is a special case outside the purview of international law's normal
prescriptions, however, have been rejected by scholars and the international
community more generally. 58 Evidencing this rejection, the UN Security
Council and the General Assembly have framed resolutions regarding Israel's
conduct and the applicable humanitarian principles in terms that assume and
insist that the Convention applies to the Occupied Territories.
59
Today, the debate about the applicability of the terms of the Geneva
Convention to the Occupied Territories has been almost completely mooted. The
Geneva Convention is largely understood as codifying international customary
law, which would apply even if the Convention did not. Even the Israeli
resolving post-war refugee or displaced person issues. Justus R. Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees'
"Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997).
56. This argument was advanced by Yehuda Z. Blum, a professor at Hebrew University and
later by Israel's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing
Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279 (1968) (cited in
Falk & Weston, supra note 26, at 138).
57. This argument is championed primarily by Professor Allan Gerson. See ALLAN GERSON,
ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-82 (1978); Allan Gerson, Trustee-
Occupant: The Legal Status of Israels Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. I (1973)
(cited in Falk & Weston, supra note 26, at 139 n.37); see also Michael Curtis, International Law and
the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457, 477-81 (1991) (endorsing a panoply of arguments against
application of Humanitarian Conventions in the Occupied Territories).
58. To quote professors Falk and Weston, "These and similar arguments are in our view
strained and artificial, and have commanded little to no respect among 'highly qualified publicists' or
within the organized international community." Falk & Weston, supra note 26, at 140.
59. For example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 607, dated January 5, 1988,
specifically requested Israel to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention. S.C. Res. 607, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/607 (1988). General Assembly Resolutions, including Resolution 51/132, are often
phrased even more sternly, demanding that Israel "accept the de jure applicability of the Convention
in the occupied Palestinian territory . . . and that it comply scrupulously with the provisions of the
Convention." G.A. Res. 51/132, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 183 (1996); see also G.A.
Res. 32/5, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., at 485, U.N. Doc. A/32/L.3/ Rev. I and Rev. I/Add. I and 2
(1977). Notably, Israel is currently in violation of approximately thirty UN Security Council
Resolutions, which are listed at http://www.vicpeace.org/fact-sheets/FactSheet6vpn.pdf. In addition,
the United States has cast its veto thirty-four times (over half of the seventy-six total times the U.S.
has exercised its veto power since the founding of the United Nations) to block draft resolutions that
were critical of Israel. See AMERICAN ISRAELI COOPRERATIVE ENTERPRISE, U.S. VETOES OF UN
RESOLUTIONS CRITICAL OF ISRAEL, 1972-2002, at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/UN/
usvetoes.html (2003); GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE USE OF THE VETO IN
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm (last visited Apr.
7, 2003) (using data from the United Nations and from SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE
PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (3rd ed., 1998)).
60. "The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols are the most
comprehensive codifications of prohibitions and regulations, and their provisions include the most
specific and wide-ranging penal norms." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for
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Supreme Court has acknowledged that the provisions of the Geneva Convention
are applicable as part of customary international law, 6 1 and Israel purports
voluntarily to apply the terms of the Convention in the Occupied Territories.
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In addition to the Geneva Convention, there are many human rights conventions
that prohibit expulsion of nationals and aliens outside the context of occupation.
For example, Israel ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in 1991, which contains provisions in Article 13 that limit the
possibilities of lawful expulsion of individuals.
63
In sum, mass expulsions are illegal under international law. It is not open to
serious debate whether forcible transfer of the Palestinians out of the Occupied
Territories in the terms cautioned by Professor van Creveld and advocated by
some extremist groups would violate international law. Instead, the question is,
given Israel's record of continued violations of international law, how to
International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81,
115-16 (2001).
61. Dwikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.). 1 (1979) (stating that the Israeli High Court
of Justice expressed that "the Hague Rules" "bind the military administration in Judea and Samaria,
being part of customary international law").
62. For instance, Israel's manual for military advocates is based on the norms of international
law and on the laws of war. I MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY
ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 50 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). Notwithstanding this
assertion, Israeli military repeatedly breaches international laws of war, such as using human shields.
Chris McGrael, Israel's human shields drawfire, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,867343,00.html. In response to the use of human
shields, Israeli human rights groups sought a supreme court order barring soldiers from seeking
protection behind human shields after their widespread use during the army's assaults on Jenin and
other West Bank cities. Id. The military admitted the policy was illegal and said it would stop, but
according to human rights groups the practice has continued in violation of international law. Id.
63. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (status as of 31 Dec.
1995), at 121 U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/14 (1996) (entered into force for Israel Oct. 3, 1991). When
ratifying the Covenant in August of 1991, Foreign Minister David Levy issued the following
reservation:
[T]he state of emergency which was proclaimed in May 1948 has remained in force
every since. This situation constitutes a public emergency within the meaning of
Article 4(1) of the Covenant. The Government of Israel has therefore found it
necessary, in accordance with the said Article 4, to take measures to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, for the defense of the State and for the
protection of life and property, including the exercise of powers of arrest and
detention. In so far as any of these measures are inconsistent with Article 9 of the
Covenant, Israel thereby derogates from its obligations under that provision.
Id. This reservation relates to arrest and detention, not expulsion, which suggests by negative
implication that Israel considers itself bound by the other provisions of the Convention.
64. Numerous informed individuals, organizations, and governmental agencies have
"abundantly and persuasively" documented Israeli violations of international law protections for
occupied peoples, as well as abuses of basic human rights. Falk & Weston, supra note 26, at 133-34.
Included among these organizations are the following: the United Nations Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Populations of the Occupied
Territories, the United States Department of State, Al Haq/Law in the Service of Man, Amnesty
International, B'Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories), the International Commission of Jurists, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
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prevent further violations of international law, particularly in the form of
military expulsion of Palestinians and in the creation of preconditions for such
expulsion. Framed in these terms, the concern over potential plans for expulsion
raises the age-old problems for international human rights discourse-the
tension between universal human rights and state sovereignty, between norm
creation and norm enforcement.
65
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVIL ADJUDICATION RESPONSE
In recent years, human rights activists have found a new mechanism for
enforcing international human rights norms-the private civil law suit in
national courts. Suits have been brought, with varying degrees of effectiveness,
• • • 66• •
against a range of different human rights abusers. To date, Palestinians may67
not be as actively involved in pursuing civil litigation as other groups, and my
aim in this last Part is to examine how that situation might change.
As a starting premise, any strategy of redress through civil litigation must
be regarded as a supplement to, not replacement for, traditional international
tools such as UN Resolutions of condemnation, international criminal
prosecution, and economic sanctions. Another starting premise is that, to be
most effective, civil adjudication should be pursued as part of an organized and
coordinated campaign. There are many potential pitfalls, and resounding failures
the National Lawyers Guild, the Palestine Human Rights Center, the Physicians for Human Rights,
the Swiss League for Human Rights, and the West Bank Data Base Project. Id. On September 10,
2002, the UN General Assembly enacted Resolution ES-10/11, which "[s]tress[ed] the need to end
the Israeli occupation," calling on Israel to stop occupying the territories and to prevent any further
discriminatory policies. Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, G.A. Res ES-10/l I, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/ES-lO/l 1 (2002),
available at http://domino.un.org.
65. For recent assessments of the effectiveness of human rights enforcement mechanisms,
see Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
121 (2001); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, II YALE L.J. 1935
(2002).
66. In the words of John Terry:
In recent years, the international human rights community's focus has shifted from
issues of norm creation to problems of human rights enforcement and the remedy and
punishment of human rights violations. Given the limited number of mechanisms
available at the intergovernmental level, human rights advocates have placed increased
emphasis on what might be called "third country legal actions"-nationally-based
remedies that attempt to hold human rights violators individually responsible for
serious human rights violations committed abroad.
John Terry, Taking Filbrtiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside the United States Should Accept
Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed Abroad, in TORT AS TORTURE 109 (Craig
Scott ed., 2001).
67. A few important exceptions exist. See infra note 117 regarding a lawsuit brought by
victims of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila against Ariel Sharon. See also Yoav Dotan, Judicial
Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice
During the Intifiada, 33 LAW & Soc'y REV. 319 (1999) (discussing, in particular, the litigation
patterns of the Palestinian movement).
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or tactical miscalculations could make international civil litigation more difficult
not only for other Palestinian claimants, but also for other victims of human
rights abuse. With these premises in mind, I first consider the overall purpose
and function of a civil litigation campaign and then turn to the particular
considerations of who, where and how.
A. Overview and Purpose of a Civil Litigation Campaign
Civil adjudication may offer a direct channel to invoke international law to
protect individual Palestinians who have suffered violations, and may also offer
a meaningful strategic tool for the larger Palestinian population as a whole.
Because adjudication focuses on the grievances of individuals and aims to
remedy proven wrongs, it can provide direct, needed and measurable relief for
harms that have not been effectively redressed through traditional channels in
the international system. However, the traditional mechanisms of international
law are still tied to the primary actor at the international level-the nation-
state.6 8 As stateless refugees, therefore, Palestinians begin with a distinct
disadvantage in acting in the international system and must in most instances
rely on indirect representation by nation-states whose sympathies they attract.
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Individual civil claims, on the other hand, circumvent many of these
limitations. By providing for the assertion of individual claims, civil litigation
can shift the focus from Palestinians as a group, tangled in a complex and
seemingly intractable political and historical situation, to individuals who have
suffered identifiable and particularized harms. These individual injuries can be
redressed, permitting the victims a degree of dignity and affirming the vitality of
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the individual rights articulated on their behalf. Underlying the very concept
68. Traditionally, international law has taken what could be described as a state-centric
approach, which posits that states are the primary actors in the international arena, and thus the
instruments of international law can only establish legal obligations and rights upon the states, not
individuals. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(1982) (stating that "international law is primarily concerned with states") (emphasis removed); Joel
Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance To Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 n.55 (2000)
(observing that since international law is focused on states, non-state actors have traditionally been
neglected). While the state-centric model has shifted to acknowledge the rights and responsibilities
of the individual, demonstrated by the advent of literally hundreds of treaties recognizing the rights
and obligations of individuals, in reality, enforcement vis-a-vis individuals is limited because there is
no international forum in which individuals can assert their rights or bring claims against a state. See
William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the
Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 130
(2000).
69. An example that demonstrates well the hindrances that apply to leaders who do not have
political autonomy is Israel's blockade of Arafat's plans to travel to attend an Arab summit. See Saud
Abu Ramadan, Arafat Unlikely to Attend Arab Summit, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/25032002-064005-5457r.htm.
70. As Harold Koh explains, "Like other accountability mechanisms, civil accountability
combines several goals: compensation of the victims, denials of safe haven to the defendant in the
judgment-rendering forum, deterrence of others who might contemplate similar conduct, and
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of adjudication is the idea that an independent decision-maker can resolve
disputes through reasoned application of law to facts and, in so doing, provide a
meaningful law-based challenge to official wrongdoing. 7 1  Moreover,
vindication of the threads of these individual claims could be woven together to
have a cumulative effect both in terms of the international publicity, political
pressure and, to the extent that claims result in enforceable judgments, financial
pressure on Israel. 7 2 Finally, by directly involving victims in the legal process
and affirming the rule of law, adjudication provides a meaningful alternative to
violence as a means to vindicate their suffering.73 In other contexts, attorneys
and advocates working with victims of human rights abuses have observed that
active participation within the legal process can be empowering and can restore
a sense of justice to victims of grave human rights abuses for whom the courts74
of their countries provided no recourse. Because of the failure of public
international law and its processes to effect solutions, some have claimed that
law has little relevance to resolving the larger Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 7 5 A
concerted adjudication campaign may be able to send a message to both sides
that law does have a role to play in resolving their conflict.
Optimism about the potential for a civil adjudication campaign should be
tempered, however, because there are many limitations and obstacles to a civil
adjudicatory approach. There are fundamental questions about how jurisdiction
can be asserted, and once asserted, maintained and effectuated in the face of
doctrines such as forum non conveniens and sovereign immunity. 7 6 There are
enunciation of legal norms opposing the conduct for which the defendant has been found liable."
Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 293, 315 (2002).
71. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 369
(1978); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 121, 121 (1982).
72. See Koh, supra note 70, at 315.
73. In the words of Richard E. Messick, co-director of the World Bank's Legal Institutions
Thematic Group:
the taking of revenge can spark an endless cycle of violence as first one side and then
the other retaliates. The adjudication of a dispute by a court of law offers an
alternative, one where facts are carefully assayed and self-defense and such other
considerations as may excuse or explain the conduct are reviewed. In short, courts are
a way to resolve disputes justly,... justice can form the basis of a lasting social order.
Richard E. Messick, The Origins and Development of Courts, 85 JUDICATURE 175, 175 (2002).
74. "Even if no monetary recovery is possible, human rights victims receive the satisfaction
that comes from a judicial acknowledgment that they have been wronged; such an acknowledgment
likely serves other purposes as well, including denying the perpetrator a safe haven and deterring
future, similar conduct." Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non
Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1001, 1081 n.338 (2001).
75. See John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation, 31 Case W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 351, 362 (1999) (warning against efforts by some to find a political solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict that disregards international law and blatantly violates Palestinian rights
on such issues as borders, settlements, displaced persons, and Jerusalem).
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also complicated questions about where to bring such litigation-generally, the
United States is an inviting forum for such claims because of the availability of
wide-ranging discovery, class actions, punitive damages, contingency fees, and
the absence of a loser-pays rule, which together permit plaintiffs to bring claims
that are difficult to sustain in other legal systems. On the other hand, the U.S.
approach to sovereign immunity7 7 and the uniquely close alliance between the
United States and Israel 78 may counsel against focusing the campaign in the
United States.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, 79 the mounting threat of military
expulsion demonstrates the potential for previously marginalized extremists to
set Israeli policy and highlights the need for a sustained and coordinated
campaign of international civil litigation to counter further human rights abuses.
While such a campaign could not directly prevent militarily enforced expulsion,
it could focus attention on the international law implicated in the Palestinian-
Israeli dispute and reduce or alleviate the preconditions for expulsion. For
example, while it might be difficult to satisfy a decision-maker that the
settlements and the related diversion of resources or the demolition of
Palestinian houses are part of a larger policy aimed at expulsion, they would be
separately cognizable as human rights violations.80 Incremental legal challenges
to claims that are collateral to or create the preconditions for an expulsion of
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories may make larger plans for systematic
expulsion less tenable. Relief from some of these on-going abuses could also
stymie the continuing escalation of tension and violence and hence create fertile
ground for meaningful peace talks.
B. Practical Considerations in Launching a Civil Adjudication Campaign
This Essay contemplates not simply the filing of an individual lawsuit or a
few random suits, but a concerted campaign. Before such a campaign could be
launched, there -re a range of practical considerations that must be addressed.
1. What is the Definition of Success?
Human rights litigation often has multiple goals. Although framed in terms
of claims for monetary relief payable to harmed individuals, even in the United
76. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Mitchell G. Bard, Roots of the U.S.-Israel Relationship, at http://www.us-
israel.org/jsource/US-lsrael/roots_ofUS-Israel.html (stating that "[tioday, the United States and
Israel are the closest of friends and allies.").
79. While I have used the current threat of military expulsion as the catalyst for launching a
campaign, the campaign would be directed at Israel's on-going violations of basic human rights.
These violations existed before Sharon came to office and are likely to continue even if the apparent
plan to militarily expel Palestinians is never executed.
80. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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States where such litigation has been the most active and successful, most
litigation does not result in a final judgment. 8 1 Of those that have resulted in a
final judgment, only rarely have they been successfully enforced.82 Even so,
such claims are still worth pursuing when the prospect of obtaining an
enforceable monetary judgment seems remote, because they serve other goals
such as provoking changes in the law, 8 3 bringing publicity to particular
causes,
8 4 
causing discomfort8 5 and embarrassment to human rights abusers,
8 6
opening avenues for factual investigation of alleged abuses by a neutral
arbiter, providing a constructive context for victims to "tell their story,,
8 8
applying pressure on domestic legislatures to respond with legislation against
repressive regimes, 8 9 encouraging consumer boycotts and the like. Another
81. See Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 485, 485 (2001). As Professor Stephens explains:
Over the past 20 years, several dozen international human rights cases have been filed
in US courts. Many have been dismissed; many are still pending. A small number have
resulted in judgments against defendants accused of violations ranging from genocide
and war crimes to torture and disappearances. While few money judgments have yet
been collected, successful plaintiffs have expressed great satisfaction in the sense of
justice and vindication they have obtained from participation in these lawsuits.
Id.
82. Id. See also Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2002).
83. Alvin J. Bronstein, Representing the Powerless: Lawyers Can Make a Difference, 49
ME. L. REV. 1 (1997).
84. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102, 106
(2000) (arguing that the "principal benefit of these [human rights] suits to their plaintiffs is the
public attention they generate").
85. The threat of law suits has already caused some discomfort for*lsraeli government
officials, as demonstrated by the fact that the Israeli government recently issued an advisory to all
government, security, and army officials, warning them that foreign travel could subject them to
lawsuits for human rights abuses in those foreign jurisdictions. Nicholas Blanford, Sharon Begins to
Take War-Crimes Lawsuit Seriously, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, July 30, 2001, at 7.
86. One Swiss scholar reluctantly acknowledged that litigation brought by Jewish Holocaust
survivors had "the beneficial effect of forcing the Swiss to revisit some of the more unpleasant
aspects of their country's history." Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in the
United States Courts; The Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 847 (2002).
87. Thomas E. Vanderbloemen, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the United States, 50 DUKE
L.J. 917, 929 (2000) (stating that "[tihe process of bringing a case before a neutral judge to explain
the abuses one has suffered has been described as a valuable part of a victim's healing process.")
(citing Edward A. Amley, Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 Judgments Abroad, 107
YALE L.J. 2177, 2180 (1998)).
88. Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
457, 459 (2001) (acknowledging that "a favorable judgment from a US court, even if not
enforceable, may provide the victims with some moral vindication and psychological redress,"
though offering a skeptical analysis of the costs associated with such litigation).
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important potential goal is provoking settlement-and there has been measured
success in this regard. Some of the most incredible success stories are the
settlements produced in response to a number of cases brought by survivors of
the Holocaust and their heirs to recover compensation for losses suffered on the
eve of, or during, World War 11.91 These cases, which confronted not only the
typical obstacles of human rights claims but also the additional problems
associated with bringing claims that are nearly a half-century old, yielded an
estimated eight billion dollars in settlements despite the fact that not a single
judgment was rendered or enforced.
9 2
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to define the actual goals of a civil
adjudication campaign, but it is worth raising a few factors to be taken into
account in determining what those goals should be. First, the larger, non-
monetary goals described above are part of a distinctly American tradition of
using litigation as a tool for social change and as a regulatory tool. 9 3 In civil law
systems, public interest litigation has not been popular or successful in part
because of "a different conception of the respective roles of legislation and
adjudication in the law-making process. '94 Even if less receptive to litigation as
a tool for social change as a general matter, European countries generally have a
... . .95
much stronger commitment to upholding and enforcing international law. As a
consequence, several European nations have made recent efforts to open their
courthouse doors to international causes, though the redress they offer is not tied
to large dollar-value judgments.96 Thus, identification of the ultimate goals must
be tied to considerations of where suits should be brought, which is discussed in
further detail below.
89. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 19 (2001) (describing the boycotts and legislative responses to human rights violations in
Burma and its relation to court cases brought on behalf of victims).
90. See id.
91. See generally Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative
Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11 (2002); William Bratton, Two Observations on Holocaust
Claims, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 321 (2001); Roger P. Alford, The Claims Resolution
Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks; Report of the Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 250 (2002).
92. Bazyler, supra note 91, at 11-12.
93. On the role of litigation as a tool for social change, see generally Kevin R. Johnson,
Lawyeringfor Social Change: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 206 (1999).
94. Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil
Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 794, 878 n.380 (1975).
95. For example, when European countries enter into treaties, in most instances the treaties
automatically become part of those nations' municipal law and are treated as binding and enforceable
through municipal mechanisms, while in the United States, the treaty must be "self-executing" or be
incorporated through domestic legislation before it has the same effect. See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, A
Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 57, 67 (1999)
(describing this difference in the context of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
96. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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Second, and also related to geographic considerations, determining the
goals of a civil adjudication campaign cannot be made wholly independent of
the separately occurring political processes in the relevant nations. The
allegations and the manner of pursuing them, even if nominally cordoned off
from the political process, will have obvious and important ramifications in the
foreign relations arena-not only between Palestinians and Israelis, but also for
the host country or countries where such litigation is brought. 97 If these foreign
relations become too troublesome for the host country, they could affect the
potential for success of such cases. For these reasons, in evaluating and
delineating the goals of a civil adjudication campaign, the larger political
context of the country that would host such litigation must be considered.
2. Who Are the Parties?
The pool of potential plaintiffs is obvious-individual Palestinians who
have suffered violations of international law. But since the first efforts will serve
as "test cases" for future ones, the most sympathetic claimants with the strongest
cases should be selected to lead the campaign. 98 The strength of these "test
cases" may affect not only the legal success of individual claims, but also the
public and political response to the campaign. For these reasons the first claims
should be evaluated both in terms of the ease of establishing wrongdoing as a
legal matter and the sources of proof needed to establish it as a factual matter,
with priority given to claims with multiple sources of evidence, including
neutral outside observers (media or human rights monitors).
As for defendants, there are more options. Corporate actors are attractive
defendants because of their ability to pay and because they cannot invoke many• .. 99
of the procedural protections available to sovereign entities. Unlike some
contexts in which large corporate interests have been accused of acting in
concert with rogue governmental entities in the perpetration of human rights
abuses, 100 however, private commercial actors in this scenario have a less direct
97. See Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal
Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 188 (1985)(describing political "fallout" from human rights litigation).
98. In an artalogous context, the American civil rights movement owes many of its greatest
successes to strategic development of test cases in civil rights litigation. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN,
THE PLESSY CASE 29-39 (1987) (tracing the test case strategy in Plessy v. Ferguson); J. CLAY
SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 at 283-85 (1993)(recounting earlier efforts to develop test case civil rights litigation).
99. See infra notes I 11-19 and accompanying text.
100. Recent efforts by human rights activists have sought to expand the bases of corporate
liability for human rights abuses to cover not only direct involvement in the execution of illegal acts
by others, but also complicity in abuses committed by others. The overall success of these
complicity theories is still uncertain, but to date they involved claims against companies whose
involvement included more than knowingly selling products used to commit human rights abuses.
Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Htuman Rights Abuses, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 347 (2001) (citing claims involving Unocal's agreements and
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role and thus their legal culpability would be more difficult to establish. For
example, the Israeli government uses tractors manufactured by the Caterpillar
Tractor Company to demolish Palestinian homes.10 1 Human rights groups have
criticized Caterpillar Tractor Company for selling tractors and equipment to the
Israeli government knowing that they might be or even are likely to be used for102
this purpose. Outrage at Caterpillar recently intensified when a Caterpillar
tractor used by the Israeli army crushed to death American peace activist Rachel
Corrie, who was trying to prevent the demolition of a Palestinian home in Gaza,
and a nine-month pregnant Palestinian woman, Nuha Sweidan, whose home fell
in on her as an adjacent home was being demolished. 10 3
activities with the government of Burma).
101. See THE PALESTINE MONITOR, INTERNATIONAL DAY OF ACTION AGAINST HOUSE
DEMOLITIONS IN PALESTINE, at http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Activism%20pal%20solidarity/
international-day-of action.htm (Aug. 23, 2002).
102. Georgetown University Professor Mark Lance resolutely described in a letter to
executives at Caterpillar that the company knows of the use to which Israel puts its equipment and
therefore it is "knowingly facilitating crimes and there is no way to avoid the responsibility that
comes with this." Letter from Mark Lance to Caterpillar, Inc. (June 24, 2002), at
http://www.sustaincampaign.org/cat-ceoletter.html. Instead of litigation, however, activist groups
have pursued a public relations campaign:
The U.S. industrial machinery giant, Caterpillar, is the main supplier of the specially
designed bulldozers which the Israeli military uses to carry out this destruction....
Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned recent home
demolitions as war crimes. We have called upon the Caterpillar Corporation to
immediately halt all sales of equipment to the Israeli military. However, to date, they
have not responded. Therefore we have decided to launch a national campaign to
expose Caterpillar's complicity in Israel's war crimes and stop its sales to the Israeli
military .... We believe that focusing this campaign against a US brand name company
that is exporting machines used directly in attacks on civilians is likely to have a
powerful effect on public opinion.
FREE PALESTINE ALLIANCE, STOP CATERPILLAR'S DESTRUCTION OF PALESTINIAN LIVES!, at
http://jerusalem.indymedia.org/news/2002/07/62747.php (July 30, 2002). In addition to the general
boycott and publicity campaign, in one protest, activists staged a mock arrest of Caterpillar
executives for war crimes. SUSTAIN, STOP U.S. TAX-FUNDED AID TO ISRAEL Now, at
http://www.sustaincampaign.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
103. Rachel Corrie was an American volunteer with the International Solidarity Movement
(ISM), a movement of "Palestinian and International activists working to raise awareness of the
struggle for Palestinian freedom and an end to Israeli occupation ... [through] nonviolent, direct-
action methods of resistance..." THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, at
http://www.palsolidarity.org/whoarewe.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). According to the ISM's
official statement regarding Rachael Corrie's death, "[d]eaths during home demolitions are far too
common. On 2 December 2002, 68-year-old Ashur Salem, deaf, was crushed to death when the
Israeli army dynamited his home while he was sleeping. On 6 February 2003, 65-year-old Kamla
Abu Said, partially deaf, was also crushed to death when the Israeli army razed her home in Gaza."
INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, STATEMENT ON THE MURDER OF RACHEL CORRIE,
available at http://bbsnews.net/bw2003-03-21c.html (Apr. 16, 2003). In another report by Human
Rights Watch, "[a]t least 20 people were injured, nine of them children, when the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) prevented residents from evacuating their home while the IDF was demolishing the
next-door house in Gaza, Human Rights Watch said in reporting eyewitness testimony..." HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, GAZA: IDF HOUSE DEMOLITION INJURES REFUGEES, at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2002/10/gaza I 024.htm (Oct. 24, 2002).
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Pursuing claims against Caterpillar in civil actions, however, might require
risking resources to develop and expand new theories of human rights liability104 . ,105
for sellers. Caterpillars moral culpability seems unmistakable, and
eventually its legal liability may be equally certain in the same way that other
corporate actors such as Swiss Banks, Ford Motor Company, or Unocal have
been held legally accountable. 106 In the early stages of the campaign, however,
formal litigation against Caterpillar under creative new legal theories may risk
detracting resources and momentum from claims against the primary source of
the harm-Israeli military policy and actions. For this reason, actions against
Caterpillar or other corporate entities should be reserved until later stages in the
107
campaign.
The primary focus of a civil litigation campaign should be the Israeli
Government and individuals working in official governmental or military
positions. The advantages of pursuing claims directly against the State of Israel
are that it is the fount of all offending policies and that it is the entity most likely
able to satisfy a monetary judgment, both because of its wealth relative to
individual actors and because it is more likely to have assets located outside of
Israel that could be attached to satisfy any resulting judgments. On the other
hand, direct suits against the State of Israel will confront more hurdles in terms
of sovereign immunity. In the United States, for example, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act would effectively preclude suit directly against the Israeli108
Government. Some European countries have recently been demonstrating a
greater willingness to lend their courts to the service of prosecuting human
104. Private entities have come under increasing scrutiny for their active and tacit
participation in human rights abuses, and international law does provide for liability under the
customary "knew or should have known" standard when a wrongdoer is essentially acting as an
agent for a defendant, but its application to sellers is as yet uncertain under international law.
JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43-44, 617 (2d ed. 2000).
105. Caterpillar's willingness to provide equipment to the Israeli military knowing that Israel
intends to use the equipment to commit grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and crimes against
humanity violates Caterpillar's own claims to social responsibility. See Tom Cordano for Pax Christi
USA, A Call to Corporate Responsibility, at http://www.sabeel.org/Cornerstone/suicidebombers/
calltocorporateresponsibility.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003) (Pax Christi USA is a national Catholic
peace movement of over 14,000 members including over 140 bishops and over 500 religious
communities).
106. See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that a private company using slave labor coerced by a state acting as its
agent may be subject to liability for violations of international law); see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding liability when defendant was "in close
cooperation with" or had "work[ed] closely with" a state in perpetrating human rights violations).
107. This conclusion does not, of course, detract from the undeniable importance of boycott
efforts and negative publicity against Caterpillar.
108. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights
Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 71, 73-78 (1998)
(describing the structure of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the hurdles it creates for
prosecution of human rights claims directly against sovereign states).
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rights claims, although to date those efforts have been focused on claims against
individual actors not state governments. 109 These considerations bring us to the
next question about where Palestinian claims should be brought.
3. Where Should Claims Be Brought?
Another practical question is where such suits should be brought.
Answering this question requires consideration of a host of variables that can
affect the outcome of a suit and must be measured against the goals that are
identified for the adjudicatory campaign. Over the past twenty years, several
dozen cases have been filed in U.S. courts seeking redress for a range of
international human rights violations throughout the modem world and reaching
110 nback into history. As noted earlier, the United States is a very attractive
forum for human rights claims because of its tradition of public interest and
impact litigation, which is facilitated by various procedural advantages such as
wide-ranging discovery, class actions, punitive damages, contingency fees, and
the absence of a loser-pays rule. 111 Notwithstanding these practical advantages,
the U.S. system nevertheless presents two potentially significant obstacles as the
forum (or at least as the primary forum) for a concerted Palestinian civil
litigation campaign in response to proposed plans for expulsion of Palestinians.
The first obstacle is procedural. In the United States, it is generally not
possible to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, which would make it
virtually impossible to bring such litigation against the Israeli Government
directly. 112 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act generally bars suits against
foreign governments, even for claims involving alleged violations of
international jus cogens or international violations that would give rise to
universal criminal jurisdiction under international law. 113
109. See infra note 115.
110. Stephens, supra note 82, at 2 (noting that "for international law scholars and
practitioners in the United States, the development of a civil remedy for international human rights
violations has been one of the most exciting and closely watched developments of the last two
decades"); Shirin Sinnar, Book Note, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 331, 331 (2002) (reviewing TORTURE AS
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSOECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION, CRAIG SCOTT, ED.) ("Once unthinkable, U.S. courts have over the last twenty years
embraced civil liability for such extraterritorial violations of international law.").
111. See Stephens, supra note 82, at 12-16 (describing the procedural advantages of
litigation in U.S. courts).
112. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) amends the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to allow suits by U.S. nationals for certain international crimes
and human rights violations, but only against states designated as "terrorist" by the U.S. State
Department, and to date, the only countries that have made the list are Iran, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, and Syria. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2001) and 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050). Given their
historical relationship, Israel is not likely to be added to this list by the U.S. State Department as a
terrorist state under the AEDPA. See supra note 59 (listing the numerous UN Security Council
vetoes cast by the United States to prevent passage of resolutions critical of Israel).
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In Europe, many countries have enacted domestic statutes or experienced
judicial innovations specifically providing for the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction for claims involving grave international crimes. For example, a
Greek court denied immunity to Germany in a case seeking compensation for
atrocities committed in violation of established international jus cogens114
norms. In another example, cases against Pinochet in the United Kingdom
and Spain l l5 represent new efforts by national courts to invoke universal
jurisdiction to try human rights abusers. Similarly, Belgium has adopted
legislation specifically enabling courts to prosecute violators of the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols, and has expanded the principle of universal
jurisdiction to permit prosecution of cases involving genocide and crimes
• . 116
against humanity. Under these changes, Ariel Sharon has already been named
in a civil "indictment" alleging that he is responsible "for the massacre, killing,
rape and disappearance of civilians that took place in Beirut between Thursday
16 and Saturday 18 September 1982 in the camps of Sabra and Shatila and
surrounding area." 17 Most recently, interpreting the Act in light of international
law on sovereign immunity, the Belgium Supreme Court ruled that Sharon could
stand trial after he leaves office. 11 Moreover, German and Swiss legislatures
113. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 246-47 (2d
Cir. 1996) (stating that violation of jus cogens norm did not constitute waiver of sovereign
immunity).
114. Bernard H. Oxman & Maria Gavouneli, Sovereign Immunity-Tort Exception-Jus
Cogens Violations-World War I/ Reparations-International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 198, 198 (2001).
115. Under specific circumstances, in some European countries, a victim of human rights
abuses can both initiate a criminal proceeding when the criminal prosecutor fails to act and join a
civil claim with the criminal proceedings in order to gain compensation. Beth Van Schaack, In
Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 145-48 (2001). This procedural
device has been successfully invoked to prosecute human rights abuses civilly as well as criminally
in a number of civil jurisdictions. For example, initiation of such proceedings in Spain by various
victims of abuses by the regime of General Augusto Pinochet have led to the request for extradition
of Pinochet from the United Kingdom to Spain. Id. at 146-47.
116. See Luc Reydams, International Decision: Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of
Brussels (Investigating Magistrate), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 701 (1999) (explaining that a Belgian
court has held the Act to apply to individuals even if they are not present in Belgium, because the
legislative intent unambiguously provides universal jurisdiction in such circumstances).
117. THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS & THE
ENVIRONMENT, THE COMPLAINT AGAINST ARIEL SHARON FOR His INVOLVEMENT IN THE
MASSACRES AT SABRA AND SHATILA, Official Translation from the French, available at
http://www.lawsociety.org/sharon/complaint.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
118. See Tom Miles, Sharon faces war crines trial once out of office, INDEP. (London), Feb.
13, 2003, at P12, available at 2003 WL 11353267 (reporting that Belgium's highest court delivered a
landmark ruling that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon can be prosecuted for war crimes after he
leaves office). Interestingly, most American papers adopted a very different tone and emphasis in
reporting the same decision. See, e.g., The World Belgian Court Won't Trv Sharon, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2003, at A 17, available at 2003 WL 2384914 (stating that "Belgium's supreme court threw out
an attempt by a group of Palestinians to bring Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to trial for war
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have remedied some of the legal obstacles that stood in the way of Jewish
Holocaust litigants in those countries, 119 and these changes presumably hold
some benefits for other human rights victims. As Europe grows more intolerant
of U.S. acquiescence in the face of Israeli human rights abuses, 120 European
countries may offer a more hospitable climate in which to bring human rights
claims on behalf of Palestinians, even if they do not offer some of the same
procedural advantages of the U.S. system.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that suits can be brought in Israel and,
in fact, many suits seeking redress for violations of Palestinian rights already121
have been pursued. While efforts within the Israeli system should be
continued, with a few notable exceptions, Israeli courts, including the Israeli
Supreme Court, have not been particularly effective at responding to or
protecting Palestinian rights. 122 Including Israel in the larger world-wide
campaign contemplated in this Essay, however, holds several potential
advantages. While it may be more difficult to obtain favorable judgments in
Israel, the prospects of enforcement are presumably higher because legal
systems tend to enforce their own judgments at higher rates than they do foreign
judgments. In addition, such judgments would have a much higher degree of
legitimacy to Israelis than foreign judgments issued by distant courts. It is also
possible that continued losses in Israeli courts might become internationally
embarrassing when contrasted to successes in other neutral fora.
crimes, but left the door open for the plaintiffs to try again after he leaves office."). Israel's "furious"
reaction to the decision suggests that at least it would interpret the former as a more accurate
characterization of the case. See Israel scorns "anti-semitic little Belgium "--Furious backlash after
court rules against Sharon, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14, 2003, at P17, available at 2003 WL
13142946.
119. Baumgartner, supra note 86, at 852.
120. Patrick E. Tyler, A Deepening Fissure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003 (arguing that the
declaration issued by Germany, Russia, and France against war in Iraq and critical of U.S. handling
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict "may go down as the loudest 'No!' shouted across the Atlantic in a
half century or more"), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/intemational/europe/
06ASSE.html. The United States' circumvention of the UN Security Council in pursuing military
action against Iraq gives credence to commentator Samuel Huntington's claim that "in the eyes of
many countries it [the United States] is becoming the rogue superpower ... [and] the single greatest
external threat to their societies." Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, FOREIGN AFF. 35,
Mar./Apr. 1999, at 42-43.
121. See Catherine M. Grosso, International Law in the Domestic Arena: The Case of
Torture in Israel, 86 IOWA L. REV. 305 (2000) (describing development of Israeli Supreme Court to
reports of incessant and deadly torture of Palestinian prisoners).
122. For example, Palestinians have appealed to the Supreme Court of Israel to try to
prevent housing demolitions that are illegal under international law. John Quigley, Punitive
Demolition of Houses: A Study in International Rights protection, 5 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 359, 384-
85 (1993). Instead of responding with condemnation of these clear violations of international human
rights, the Court has instead given great latitude to the commanders. Id.
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4. Which Claims Should Be Pursued?
One strategic decision advocates will have to consider is which claims and
which genres of claims should be brought. Although I use the threat of military
expulsion as the catalyst for this discussion, it is clear that civil litigation could
not actually prevent or provide full and meaningful relief from a military
campaign of expulsion. Instead, the claims that could be brought would be
against the Israeli actions that arguably establish the preconditions for
,. 123
expulsion. The question, though, is which claims should be pursued?
It is at least theoretically possible that claims could be brought for the
original dispossessions in 1948. Claims of ethnic cleansing of Palestinian
villages that accompanied the War of 1948 would find renewed support in
recently released Israeli Defense Forces documents and other security
documents that the Israeli government has released. 124 But given the difficulties
in developing evidentiary proofs for events so long in the past and the enormous
consequences of a case based on such claims, prudence would caution against
pursuing such historical claims, at least initially. Instead, it seems that litigation
in the short run would be most effective at providing remedies for more
proximate harms that are presently occurring or have recently occurred in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. As previously noted, strategists developing a civil
litigation campaign should choose the strongest recent claims, both in terms of
their legal basis and the potential sources of evidence to set a groundwork for
either further adjudication or political resolution of some of the pervasive and
deeply rooted problems.
5. Potential Backlash
Even assuming that advocates were successful at a procedural level in
bringing and sustaining suits against the Israeli Government, one likely response
from Israelis would be counter suits-such as claims that the Palestinian
Authority is orchestrating suicide bombings against civilians in Israel. 125 If
Arafat or officials under his control were ever proven to be involved in these
violations of international human rights law, they could, in addition to being
held criminally liable, also be found civilly liable for such violations. 12 6 But to
123. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (explaining Israeli actions taken as
precursors to expulsion).
124. See generally MORRIS, supra note 11.
125. Even before the full swing of the current human rights litigation, some suits had been
brought against Arafat and the PLO. For example, Shimon Prachik filed a petition in the Israeli
courts seeking to charge Arafat with terrorist crimes, which was submitted to Israel's High Court in
May 1994. The petition alleged that Arafat was responsible for numerous terror attacks in Israel and
abroad. Evelyn Gordon, High Court Asked to Order Criminal Probe of Arafat When He Enters Gaza
or Jericho, THE JERUSALEM POST, May 12, 1994, at 2. For a famous example in the United States,
see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
126. Suicide bombings against Israeli civilians are war crimes and crimes against humanity.
[7:2003]
A Palestinian Civil Litigation Campaign
date the extent of the Arafat and the Palestinian Authority's involvement remains
contested and direct proof of such involvement has not materialized.
12 7
Nevertheless, it is not necessary to speculate whether the underlying accusations
could be used as the premise for counter-litigation because lawyers representing
thirty-three Israelis and Belgians have already brought suit in Belgium alleging
that Arafat initiated terrorist attacks. 128 It is also not difficult to imagine from
these initial suits the potential for a frenzy of lawsuits, brought by Palestinians
and Israelis alike, each complaining of grievances caused by the other. If the
frenzy were to reach epidemic proportions, it would also be fair to imagine
considerable backlash from the political establishment of countries that were
host to such suits.
Political response could take the form of legislative curtailments of the
bases for jurisdiction or additions to the already difficult burden of evading
sovereign immunity protections. In the United States and common law
jurisdictions, in addition to the possibility of legislative responses, there is also
the possibility that an onslaught of these cases would inspire courts to more129
willingly dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, under the
.... 130
Political Question Doctrine or based on direct interjection by the executive
urging deference to Israel. As many have observed, human rights litigation in
the United States does not occur in a political vacuum, even if it occurs in
politically independent courts. 13 2 Some already argue against the genre
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT: SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST
ISRAELI CIVILIANS, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA 1002-
04.htm#P586 122723 (Nov. 2002).
127. In its report, Human Rights Watch condemned Arafat and the Palestinian Authority for
failing to take appropriate actions to deter suicide bombings, thereby improperly fostering an
"atmosphere of impunity," but it concluded based on the information available to it that the
Palestinian Authority's failure to take preventative action or punish perpetrators outside of its control
does not meet the criteria for command responsibility under international law. See id. at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002-07.htm#PI077_287405.
128. THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, VICTIMS OF
TERROR FILE SUIT AGAINST YASSER ARAFAT IN BELGIUM, at http://www.ict.org.i/spotlight/
det.cfm?id=712 (Nov. 28, 2001).
129. Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens
in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 44-49 (1998) (providing an overview of how
defendants use forum non conveniens to dismiss human rights cases in federal court).
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm among human rights advocates for civil adjudication as a tool
against international violations, many oppose or at least caution against it, including support for the
use of forum non conveniens dismissals. See, e.g., Short, supra note 74.
130. K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 277
(2001).
131. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 687-99 (2d ed., 1992) (describing the "Bernstein exception" to the
Act of State Doctrine, which allows the Executive to submit by letter its complaint that litigation of
the relevant issues may cause embarrassment to the Executive).
132. Many critics argue that courts should defer to the Executive on issues of human rights.
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altogether as a perversion of the proper role of the U.S. legal system and a threat
to U.S. foreign policy. 133 Any campaign on behalf of Palestinians should be
coordinated to be effective in the long-term, minimizing the potential for
backlash by nations hosting the litigation.
6. The Possible Creation of an International Civil Tribunal
Instead of closing national courthouse doors, a firestorm of lawsuits might
also force consideration of the establishment of an international civil tribunal.
The possibility of a permanent, all-purpose civil international court has been
raised before. 134 However, such aspirations still seem remote and unrealistic,
particularly in light of the disruption the United States recently caused with
creation of a permanent international criminal court. 135 The other alternative, for
which there already exists significant precedent, is creation of specialized ad hoe
tribunals to respond to large numbers of claims arising out of particular
relationships. The most famous of these tribunals, borne out of the onslaught of
lawsuits brought against Iran in response to its nationalization of American
property and taking of American hostages, is the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,,. 136
which to date has resolved more than 3,000 claims. 16More recently, the United
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was created by the United Nations
and has ordered compensation on more than 125,000 claims brought by those
injured by Iraq's actions during the first Persian Gulf War.137 The most recent
See, e.g., Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2158-81 (1999); Covey T. Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in
Applying Norms of Customary International Law of Human Rights in United States Courts, 4 HOuS.
J. INT'L L. 59, 63 (1981) (judges should defer to decisions of political branches in many human
rights cases); Comment, 28 U.S.C. §' 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in Paraguay, 69 GEO. L.J.
833, 846 (198 1) (arguing that the court in Filartiga "should have refrained from imposing a new rule
of international law upon the political branches").
133. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 457, 458 (2001); Jacques Delisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A
"Sinical" Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 473 (2002).
134. Mark Gibney, On the Need for an International Civil Court, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 47 (2002).
135. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An
Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665 (1996); Christopher Keith Hall, Current Development: The
Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 126-27 (1998).
136. Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:
International Adjudication in Ascendence, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 160, 160 (2000).
137. Id. One of the main criticisms of the UNCC is that the reparations and sanctions
imposed on Iraq after the first Gulf War are unduly oppressive and have led to widespread and
severe suffering, malnutrition, and death, particularly among children in Iraq. See George Bisharat,
Sanctions as Genocide, II TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379, 381 (2001) (stating that "[i]n
the twelve years that have followed [the imposition of sanctions], as many as one to two million
Iraqis may have died as a result of sanctions, many of them children under the age of five."); Roger
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and most analogous tribunals are the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant
Accounts in Switzerland and the International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims, both of which were created to facilitate payment of thousands
of claims brought by Holocaust survivors. 138
The potential, however, for establishing an international civil compensation
tribunal or system faces significant obstacles. First, there is the question of
legitimacy since it seems unlikely such a tribunal could be created under the
auspices of the United Nations. Because the United States supplies Israel
annually with approximately $3 billion per year ($1.2 billion in economic aid
and $1.8 billion in military aid, 139 which is roughly one-sixth of all U.S. Foreign
aid), 140 it seems unlikely that the United States would support establishment of a
system designed to force Israel to pay out large sums of money. This reality
makes creation of a tribunal directly by the UN highly unlikely since it would
have to depend on the unlikely participation of the United States. The potential
for a tribunal based on the model of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, however,
may still be a possibility. One of the necessary preconditions for establishing
such a tribunal in the absence of U.S. support and without the consent of Israel
• ~141l
would be broad based multi-lateral support. A significant number of claims
that are based on compelling and well-founded allegations might signal the need
for creation of such a tribunal, and mounting international frustration at the lack
of peaceful and law-based options may be enough to inspire the necessary
political will.
Another important precondition, if the tribunal is to render effective and not
just symbolic awards, is a fund of identified assets against which awards could
be enforced. The basis for establishing the Iran Claims Tribunal was the seizure
P. Alford, On War as Hell, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 207, 212-14 (2002) (describing effect of WWI
sanctions on Germany and the conditions leading to the rise of the Nazi regime, and Iraqi responses
to the oppressive burden of reparations under the UNCC).
138. Alford, supra note 136, at 160; Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of
Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 795, 802 & 802 n. 16 (2002).
139. CLYDE MARK, ISRAEL: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 3, available at
http://www.adc.org/IB85066.pdf (last updated Oct. 17, 2002).
140. Shirl McArthur, U.S. Tax Dollars at Work: Calculating Foreign Aid to Israel,
http://www.hotpolitics.com/tax4israel.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). According to one source, for
every dollar in U.S. aid that goes to an African, $250.65 goes to an Israeli. At
http://www.rescuemideastpolicy.com/factsheet/usinside/usaidinside.pdf (last visted Mar. 29, 2003).
This statistic is remarkable in light of the fact that Israel is the sixteenth wealthiest country in the
world, and the sixth most powerful in terms of military might. Id.
141. When this Essay was originally drafted and presented at the October 2002 Journal of
Gender, Race & Justice symposium, broad-based multi-lateral support for such a purpose seemed
rather unlikely. Since that time, however, many European nations have demonstrated dismay at the
United States' partisan support for Israel. See supra note 120. In light of these events, the prospect of
European support for an international mechanism to hold Israel accountable for human rights abuses
seems much more likely today.
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of sizable Iranian assets located in the United States 142 and the basis for the
UNCC was Iraq's oil reserves. Unlike Iran or Iraq's enormous oil wealth, Israel
does not appear to have a readily identifiable pool of government assets located
abroad. 14 3 Even more significant than the question of the amount of assets is the
question of whether even sympathetic governments would be willing to go to the
extraordinary measure of freezing Israeli assets to create a fund that could
provide a basis for an international tribunal. 144 If these obstacles could ever be
surmounted, an international tribunal could offer the most neutral and legitimate
forum for adjudication of Palestinian human rights claims.
V. CONCLUSION
My purpose in this Essay is to open for consideration the possibility of a
civil adjudication campaign as a peaceful and law-based response to certain
Palestinian claims against Israel. The ominous and apparently growing threat of
forced expulsion renders unacceptable continued reliance solely on the chorus of
international condemnation or the blunt instruments of political negotiations.
Viewed in the most hopeful light, civil litigation may offer a peaceful response
to Palestinian injuries caused by Israeli conduct and a mechanism for exerting
sustained and continued pressure on Israel to respect international law. While it
142. David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 129 (1990).
[T]he Algiers Accords established a fund, the Security Account, with a portion of the
Iranian assets that the United States had frozen. With the Algerian Government acting
as escrow agent for the Security Account pursuant to the Tribunal's instructions, the
Security Account assures the availability of funds to satisfy most awards of the
Tribunal.
Id. The UNCC created a payment mechanism by tapping 30 percent of all Iraqi oil revenues to pay
claimants. Alford, supra note 137, at 212.
143. Israel's economy may also be considered relatively fragile, despite its size, as
demonstrated by its recent downslide caused by enormous military expenditures, as well as the
decline in investment and tourism as a consequence of the recent violence. See generally Ben
Lynfield, Israel's Poor Lost in Political Fray, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, Nov. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/I 121/pO6sOl-wome.html; Avi Machlis, Israel's Economy Takes a
Hit, Tourism Takes a Blow, JEWISH TEL. AGENCY, available at http://www.jewishsf.com/bk001110/
icrisisecon.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2003); Sam Bahour, Israels Economy is in Disarray, MIDDLE
EAST TIMES, available at http://www.metimes.com/2K2/issue2002-40/bus/israels-economy-is.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
144. While it is a significant question, an affirmative answer may not be entirely implausible
when viewed in light of recent international campaigns to divest from Israel. See generally DIVEST
FROM ISRAEL CAMPAIGN, YALE DIVEST Now, YALE UNIVERSITY DIVESTMENT PETITION, at
http://www.divest-from-israel-campaign.org/Yale/DivestfromlsraelPetition.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2003); UC DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN, PETITION FOR UC DIVESTMENT FROM ISRAEL, at
http://ucdivest.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2003) (detailing various university divestment projects); see
also Desmond Tutu, Build Moral Pressure To End The Israeli Occupation Of The Palestinian
Lands, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 14, 2002, at 9, available at 2002 WL 2886934 (calling
international divestiture a necessary first step to ending the Israeli occupation).
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would not likely resolve the largest questions involving trenchant land issues,
14 5
it might be able to refocus attention on those issues by providing an outlet
through which to evaluate and provide relief for the auxiliary claims which arise
out of on-going practices, incite emotions and distract from reasoned resolution
of these larger issues. There remain innumerable practical and strategic
obstacles to be considered in actually launching a civil adjudication campaign.
As the odious and previously inconceivable idea of expelling the Palestinians is
apparently gaining political momentum, however, so too must the previously
implausible idea of an international civil litigation campaign. Indeed, a
concerted international adjudication campaign may provide a practical means of
chipping away at underlying policies and practices that have made expulsion
seem like an achievable aim to some in Israel.
145. It is not entirely impossible that some land issues could be resolved through
adjudication. Cf Hans van Houtte, Mass Property Claim Resolution in a Post-War Society: The
Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 625
(1999).

